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Cisco Catalyst 9000 Series Switch Practical Guide (Security Features) (Telemetry)

March 25, 2021

Catalyst 9000 Security Features

Visibility	 Mission-critical application visibility (NBAR)* Full NetFlow telemetry
Segmentation	 Highest level of macro and micro segmentation with SD-Access Multidomain policy integration
Threat defense	 MACsec 256-bit link encryption Encrypted Traffic Analytics* Trustworthy solutions

* Roadmap on Cisco Catalyst 9500 High Performance and Catalyst 9600 Series

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Consistently delivered throughout the Cisco[®] Catalyst[®] 9000 family

TECARC-2900

Security

DAI

IP Source Guard

First Hop Security

SISF

MACsec

Network authentication

Segmentation


Trustworthy solutions

Embedded Security Features – to refresh

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Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)

Dynamic ARP Inspection is a function that manages the mapping between MAC address and IP address on the switch and protects the network from attacks using malicious ARP packets. This feature protects your network by detecting / dropping rogue ARP packets sent by attackers. This function can also be used when assigning an IP address by DHCP when used in combination with the DHCP Snooping function.



Dynamic ARP inspection - example

show device-tracking policy DT-PROGRAMMATIC Policy DT-PROGRAMMATIC configuration: security-level glean device-role node **Enable DHCP Snooping and DAI** gleaning from Neighbor Discovery gleaning from DHCP * The device-tracking setting is gleaning from ARP ip dhcp snooping vlan 211 automatically set according to the gleaning from DHCP4 ip dhcp snooping snooping setting. NOT gleaning from protocol unkn limit address-count for IPv4 per mac 1 tracking enable ip arp inspection vlan 211 Policy DT-PROGRAMMATIC is applied on the following targets: Target Type Policy Feature Target range vlan 211 VLAN DT-PROGRAMMATIC Device-tracking vlan all show device-tracking policy default


Policy default configuration: **Enable device tracking on Interface** security-level guard device-role node gleaning from Neighbor Discovery * For C9k, change from ip devicegleaning from DHCP interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 gleaning from ARP tracking to device-tracking. switchport access vlan 211 gleaning from DHCP4 switchport mode access NOT gleaning from protocol unkn Policy default is applied on the following targets: device-tracking Target Type Policy Feature Target range Gi1/0/17 PORT default Device-tracking vlan all

* The policy applied to the physical interface has priority over DT-PROGRAMMATIC.

IP Source Guard

The IP Source Guard feature is a security feature that limits communication from rogue IP addresses by maintaining an IP address-port mapping table and blocking IP traffic that does not match this table. You can use this feature to prevent an attacker from invading your network.

This function can also be used when assigning an IP address by DHCP when used in combination with the DHCP Snooping function.



IP Source Guard – config example

Activation of DHCP Snooping

ip dhcp snooping vlan 211 ip dhcp snooping

Create a policy for Device Tracking

device-tracking policy TEST01 limit address-count 100 no protocol arp tracking enable

Enable IP source guard on Interface

interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 switchport access vlan 211 switchport mode access device-tracking attach-policy TEST01 ip verify source tracking


* Apply policy to physical interface

no protocol arp

- Set ARP not to snoop
- Required for IP Source Guard operation


show device-tracking policy TEST01


Policy TEST01 configuration: security-level guard device-role node gleaning from Neighbor Discovery gleaning from DHCP NOT gleaning from ARP gleaning from DHCP4 NOT gleaning from protocol unkn limit address-count 100 tracking enable Policy TEST01 is applied on the following targets: Target Type Policy Feature Target range Gi1/0/17 PORT TEST01 Device-tracking vlan all



IPv6 First Hop Security - DHCP Guard

Stop rogue DHCP response





DoS attacks

RA Guard / DHCP Guard - config

<RA Guard>

Create RA guard policy

ipv6 nd raguard policy TEST01 device-role host

* Manually set the RA guard policy

Attach RA guard policy to Interface

interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 switchport access vlan 211 switchport mode access device-tracking ipv6 nd raguard attach-policy TEST01

* Enable Device-Tracking

<DHCP Guard>

Create DHCP guard policy

ipv6 dhcp guard policy TEST01 device-role client

* Manually set the DHCP guard policy

Attach DHCP guard policy to Interface

interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 switchport access vlan 211 switchport mode access device-tracking ipv6 dhcp guard attach-policy TEST01

* Enable Device-Tracking

SISF-based Device-Tracking

- The Switch Integrated Security Feature based (SISF-based) Device Tracking feature is a feature that supplements new device information to replace the traditional IP Device-Tracking and IPv6 Snooping (IOS-XE 16.3.x and later).
- SISF snoops the traffic received by the switch, extracts the device IDs (MAC and IP addresses) and stores them in the binding table.
- Many features such as IEEE 802.1X, Web Authentication, Cisco TrustSec, and LISP use this feature.
- SISF-based device tracking supports both IPv4 and IPv6
- SISF-based Device-Tracking must be used as an alternative to IP Device-Tracking on the Cisco Catalyst 9000 Series

show device-tracking database — output example

Network Layer Address	Link Layer Address	Interface	vlan	prlvl	age	state	Time left
L 192.168.202.254	0000.0c9f.f460	VI1025	1025	0100	1684mn	DOWN	
L 192.168.201.254	0000.0c9f.f461	VI1026	1026	0100	1683mn	REACHABLE	
ARP 192.168.201.51	50f7.22ae.25c1	Gi1/0/2	1026	0005	4mn	REACHABLE	39 s try 0
ARP 192.168.201.14	000c.29ec.d0b4	Gi1/0/1	1026		91s	REACHABLE	210 s try 0
DH4 192.168.201.13	000c.29bd.d112	Gi1/0/1	1026	0025	3mn	REACHABLE	86 s try 0(590324 s)
ARP 192.168.201.12	000c.29dc.e708	Gi1/0/1	1026	0005	29s	REACHABLE	286 s try 0
DH4 192.168.201.11	000c.298f.15e1	Gi1/0/1	1026	0025	65s	REACHABLE	247 s try 0(590330 s)

SISF-based Device-Tracking - config

Manual creation

You can create your own Profile.

Higher priority than auto-generated

Profiles can be created with device-tracking policy and applied to VLAN Configuration or physical interfaces

Physical interfaces take precedence over VLANs

Automatically generated

Created automatically in each of the following cases:

IEEE 802.1X, web authentication, Cisco TrustSec, and IPSG features: enter the ip dhcp snooping vlan vlan command.

Cisco Locator/ID Separation Protocol.

EVPN on VLAN

Automatically generated policy sample

	0	
gleaning from	m Neighbor Discovery	←ipv6 ND information collection enabled
gleaning from	m DHCP	←ipv6 DHCP information collection enabled
gleaning from	m ARP	←ipv4 ARP information collection enabled
gleaning from	m DHCP4	←ipv4 DHCP information collection enabled
NOT gleanin	g from protocol unkn	
limit address	s-count for IPv4 per mac 1	
tracking ena	ble	
Policy DT-PRC	OGRAMMATIC is applied on	the following targets:
Target	Type Policy Featu	e Target range
vlan 211	VLAN DT-PROGRAMMAT	IC Device-tracking vlan all
vlan 212	VLAN DT-PROGRAMMAT	IC Device-tracking vlan all
vlan 213	VLAN DT-PROGRAMMAT	IC Device-tracking vlan all
vlan 214	VLAN DT-PROGRAMMAT	IC Device-tracking vlan all
vlan 215	VLAN DT-PROGRAMMAT	IC Device-tracking vlan all


IP Device Tracking - differences

IP Device Tracking (IPDT) config	SISF-Based config (Cisco IOS XE Denali 16.3.7 or later)
ip device tracking probe count	It is set to the default value (3 times) and cannot be changed.
ip device tracking probe delay	It is set to the default value (10 seconds) and cannot be changed.
ip device tracking probe interval	device-tracking binding reachable-lifetime
ip device tracking probe use-svi	It is set as the default behaviour and cannot be changed
ip device tracking probe auto-source [fallback host-ip-address subnet-mask] [override]	device-tracking tracking auto-source [fallback host-ip-address subnet-mask] [override]
ip device tracking trace-buffer	Not supported
ip device tracking maximum n	device-tracking policy <policy name=""> limit address-count <n></n></policy>
ip device tracking maximum 0	Not supported
clear ip device tracking all	Not supported

https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3850/software/release/16-9/configuration_guide/sec/b_169_sec_3850_cg/configuring_sisf_based_device_tracking.html

SISF-Device Tracking Operation check

Check the state of the Device Tracking database when SISF-DT is enabled and the operation when the Limit Address Count is exceeded.



* The maximum DT value of C9300 can be set up to 32,000.

Device Tracking – check the database

Limit address - count 2

C9300-1#show device-tracking database Binding Table has 3 entries, 2 dynamic (limit 100000) Codes: L - Local, S - Static, ND - Neighbor Discovery, ARP - Address Resolution Protocol, DH4 - IPv4 DHCP, DH6 - IPv6 DHCP, PKT - Other Packet, API - API created Preflevel flags (prlvl): 0001:MAC and LLA match 0002:Orig trunk 0004:Orig access 0008:Orig trusted trunk 0010:Orig trusted access 0020:DHCP assigned 0040:Cga authenticated 0080:Cert authenticated 0100:Statically assigned Network Layer Address Link Layer Address Interface vlan prlvl age state Time left 502f.a8b0.f701 Gi1/0/1 5 0005 150s REACHABLE 155 s try 0 ARP 5.5.5.11 ARP 5.5.5.7 580a.2013.ebc1 Gi1/0/1 5 0005 3mn REACHABLE 126 s try 0 L 5.5.5.1 701f.5301.2cc7 VI5 5 0100 58mn REACHABL Third and subsequent device IPs are not stored in the database except for the Local SVI

Check the communication status when Limit address count 2

Check the communication status from each device to the gateway

Node-1#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/4 ms

Node-2#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/4 ms

Node-3#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/4 ms

Communication to SVI (5.5.5.1) of C9300 is possible even if the Device Tracking Table Limit is exceeded.

Set IP Source Guard and check the communication status

Node-1#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/4 ms

Node-2#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/4 ms

Node-3#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds:

Success rate is 0 percent (0/5)

Add IP Source Guard to C9300

interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 switchport access vlan 5 switchport mode access device-tracking attach-policy TEST ip verify source tracking

IPs that are not on the device tracking database will be incommunicable

Check the Device Tracking database

Limit address - count 3

C9300-1#show device-tracking database Binding Table has 4 entries, 3 dynamic (limit 100000) Codes: L - Local, S - Static, ND - Neighbor Discovery, ARP - Address Resolution Protocol, DH4 - IPv4 DHCP, DH6 - IPv6 DHCP, PKT - Other Packet, API - API created Preflevel flags (prlvl): 0001:MAC and LLA match 0002:Orig trunk 0004:Orig access 0008:Orig trusted trunk 0010:Orig trusted access 0020:DHCP assigned 0040:Cga authenticated 0080:Cert authenticated 0100:Statically assigned

Network Layer Address	Link Layer Address Interface	vlan prlvl age state Time left
ARP 5.5.5.11	502f.a8b0.f701 Gi1/0/1 5	0005 3mn REACHABLE 128 s try 0
ARP 5.5.5.8	b08b.cf48.a901 Gi1/0/1 5	0005 2s REACHABLE 307 s
ARP 5.5.5.7	580a.2013.ebc1 Gi1/0/1 5	0005 3mn REACHABLE 98 s try 0
L 5.5.5.1	701f.5301.2cc7 VI5 5 010	00 68mn REACHABLE

Except for the Local SVI, the addresses of 3 hosts are listed on the table.

Check the communication status when Limit address count 3

Check the communication status from each device to the gateway

Node-1#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/2/4 ms

Node-2#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/4 ms


Node-3#ping 5.5.5.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 5.5.5.1, timeout is 2 seconds: !!!!! Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/4 ms

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Of course, any terminal can communicate with the gateway

MACSEC

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MACsec (MAC security)

The technology that encrypts Ethernet communication and prevents the contents from being stolen even if the communication is intercepted.

The Cisco Catalyst 9200 / 9200L is the first entry level access switch to support MACsec.

Equipped with MACsec encryption chip Line rate performance hardware processing

Where applicable	MACsec	Cat 9200		Cat9200L	
		IOS-XE	License	IOS-XE	License
Between switches	128 Bits SAP	16.10.1	Network Essentials	16.9.1	Network Essentials
	128 Bits MKA	16.10.1	Network Essentials	16.9.1	Network Essentials
Switch to host	128 Bits MKA	TBD		TBD	

Important


- Please note that if the MACsec settings do not match each other, Link will be Down.

- HA configuration and MACsec from the host to the switch are supported from 16.12.1.

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MACsec encryption between switch and host

Host-to-switch encryption (using IEEE 802.1X)



Step1


IEEE 802.1X authenticates the endpoint and transfers the required encryption key information (MKA) to both sides.

Step2

MACsec encrypts the communication using a master key derived from authentication

* Use AnyConnect as a supplicant (IOS-XE 16.10.1 or later)





MACsec key derivation scheme

MACsec has two main mechanisms for key derivation schemes.

	SAP (Security Association Protocol)	MKA (MACsec Key Agreement)
General	Cisco's proprietary key negotiation protocol	Defined in IEEE802.1X-2010
Where applicable	Used only for encryption between switches	Used between switches, between terminals and switches, and between routers
Usage mode	Manual mode IEEE802.1x mode	Manual mode IEEE802.1x mode

How to configure MACsec


Encryption between switches (1/2)

key chain macsectest macsec key 111111 cryptographic-algorithm aes-128-cmac key-string 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef lifetime local 12:12:12 Jan 1 2019 infinite

mka policy macsectest key-server priority 200 macsec-cipher-suite gcm-aes-128

#default

Interface gi1/0/10 switchport mode trunk macsec network-link mka policy macsectest mka pre-shared-key key-chain macsectest macsec replay-protection window-size 10



Since it is a setting between switches, select "network-link"

How to check MACsec

Encryption between switches (2/2)

C9200L#show macsec interface gi1/0/10 MACsec is enabled Replay protect : enabled	MACsec Activated	₹ ₹
Replay window : 0 Include SCI : yes Use ES Enable : no Use SCB Enable : no Admin Pt2Pt MAC : forceTrue(1)		Encrypted data Switch-to-switch negotiation: EAPoL
Pt2Pt MAC Operational : no Cipher : GCM-AES-128 Confidentiality Offset : 0		Encrypt with AES128 bit
Capabilities ICV length : 16 Data length change supported: yes Max. Rx SA : 16 Max. Tx SA : 16 Max. Rx SC : 8 Max. Tx SC : 8 Validate Frames : strict		
PN threshold notification support : No Ciphers supported : GCM-AES-128		GCM-AES-128 is the only supported encryption suite for the 9200 series.


switch

* Note: When using MACsec on a multi-chassis EtherChannel, if a master switch fail, the MKA will not be retained and it will take several tens of seconds to reestablish the session, during which the link will not be able to communicate.

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switch


Media Access Control Security (MACsec 256)



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TECARC-2900

Where is MACsec performed in Hardware? Applicable for UADP 2.0/3.0/Mini ASIC




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
TECARC-2900

Network Authentication IEEE802.1x

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


Network Authentication General Flow of IEEE 802.1X Authentication




- EAPoL refers to the forwarding mechanism and does not provide a mechanism for authentication
- If you want to use 802.1X authentication, you need to select his EAP type on the terminal supplicant side.
- EAP-TLS (client certificate), PEAP (username / password), etc.

Network authentication MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) Flow



Network authentication


Central Web Authentication (CWA) Flow



WEB authentication screen


Network authentication host mode

There are four main modes for network authentication:



Data

Endpoint



hosts ride on the first authentication result and bypass the authentication.

Multi-Domain Auth (MDA)

VLAN*

Data

Endpoint

Endpoint 1

Authenticated

Hub

Piggyback

Endpoint 2

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dACL


VLAN*

Cisco Catalyst 9200L Series Verification Results Summary

Host mode	VLAN assignment	dot1x	MAB	CWA
Single Host	None	0	0	0
	Dynamic vlan	0	0	Ο
Multi- Authentication	None	0	0	0
	Dynamic vlan	0	Ο	0

Config example (1) 802.1X Multi authentication + Dynamic VLAN

802.1X Multi Authentication on Cisco Catalyst 9200 L → Configure Dynamic VLAN Per User



ISE configuration example

User info

Username	Identity Group
user1	vlan211
user2	vlan212

Authorization Profile settings

AuthZ Profiles	Vlan
vlan211_permit	211
vlan212_permit	212

Authorization rule settings

Identity Group	Results
vlan211	vlan211_permit
vlan212	vlan212_permit

/ Edit 🕂 Add	🔠 Change Status 👻	🔂 Import 🚯 Export 👻 🗙 Delete 👻 🖓 Duplicate
Status	Name 🔺	User Identity Groups Admin
🗌 🔽 Enabled	🡤 ad01	staff-group
🗌 🔽 Enabled	🡤 caadmin	ALL_ACCOUNTS (default)
🗌 🔽 Enabled	🧕 sponsor	ALL_ACCOUNTS (default)
🗌 🔽 Enabled	🧕 user 1	vlan211
🗌 🔄 Enabled	👤 user2	vlan212
🛛 🔽 Enabled	👤 user3	ALL_ACCOUNTS (default)
🗌 🔽 Enabled	🙎 user4	ALL_ACCOUNTS (default)

ess Type = ACCESS_ACCEPT nel-Private-Group-ID = 1:212 nel-Type = 1:13 nel-Medium-Type = 1:6

xceptions (0) andard		
Status Rule Name	Conditions (identity groups and other conditions)	Permissions
🗹 vlan211	if vlan211 the	n vlan211_permi
vlan212	if vlan212 the	n vlan212_perm
🗹 Permit_all	if Any the	n PermitAccess
Default	if no matches, then DenvAccess	

Configuring 802.1X

aaa new-model	Enable AAA
aaa authentication dot1x default group radius aaa authorization network default group radius	
aaa accounting dot1x default start-stop group radius	Specify a server group to be used for authentication, authorization, and accounting
aaa server radius dynamic-author client 10.10.30.177 server-key cisco	
auth-type all	Specify Radius server information and shared key information
dot1x system-auth-control	
radius server ISE address ipv4 10.10.30.177 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813	Define a server group
key cisco	
interface GigabitEthernet1/0/11 switchport mode access	Enable authentication on Interface and specify multi-authentication mode
device-tracking authentication host-mode multi-auth	
authentication order dot1x mab authentication port-control auto	<important></important>
authentication periodic	The authentication port of C9200L is set by mode access.
map	You need to create a VLAN to assign with Dynamic vlan on the C9200L

Cisco Catalyst 9200 L show command 1

Multi-authentication succeeds on Cisco Catalyst 9200 L and you can see two devices

Switch#show authentication sessions int gi1/0/11 Interface MAC Address Method Domain Status Fg Session ID

 Gi1/0/11
 2852.6168.d101 dot1x
 DATA
 Auth
 A51E0A0A0000004D35EC5E80

 Gi1/0/11
 2c0b.e9ad.ad81 dot1x
 DATA
 Auth
 A51E0A0A0000004C35EC5378

Key to Session Events Blocked Status Flags:

- A Applying Policy (multi-line status for details)
- **D** Awaiting Deletion
- F Final Removal in progress
- I Awaiting IIF ID allocation
- P Pushed Session
- R Removing User Profile (multi-line status for details)
- U Applying User Profile (multi-line status for details)
- X Unknown Blocker

Cisco Catalyst 9200 L show command 2

User ID of the terminal with MAC

Switch#show authentication sessions int gi1/0/11 details Interface: GigabitEthernet1/0/11 IIF-ID: 0x1AA0AC98

MAC Address: 2c0b.e9ad.ad81

IPv6 Address: Unknown IPv4 Address: Unknown

User-Name: user1

Status: Authorized Domain: DATA Oper host mode: multi-auth Oper control dir: both Session timeout: 3600s (local), Remaining: 2972s Timeout action: Reauthenticate Common Session ID: A51E0A0A000004C35EC5378 Acct Session ID: 0x0000009 Handle: 0x1a00000c Current Policy: POLICY_Gi1/0/11

Local Policies:

Service Template: DEFAULT_LINKSEC_POLICY_SHOULD_SECURE (priority 150) Security Policy: Should Secure

Server Policies:

Vlan Group: Vlan: 211

VLAN 211 assigned to User1

Method status list:

Method State dot1x Authc Success IIF-ID: 0x1D17F138 MAC Address: 2852.6168.d101 IPv6 Address: Unknown IPv4 Address: Unknown User-Name: user2 Status: Authorized Domain: DATA Oper host mode: multi-auth Oper control dir: both Session timeout: 3600s (local), Remaining: 2975s Timeout action: Reauthenticate Common Session ID: A51E0A0A0000004D35EC5E80 Acct Session ID: 0x000000a Handle: 0xc00000d

User ID of the terminal with MAC address 2852.6168.d101

Local Policies:

Service Template: DEFAULT_LINKSEC_POLICY_SHOULD_SECURE (priority 150) Security Policy: Should Secure

Server Policies:

Vlan Group: Vlan: 212

Current Policy: POLICY Gi1/0/11

Interface: GigabitEthernet1/0/11

VLAN 212 assigned to User2

Method status list: Method State dot1x Authc Success

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Check the authentication log

diate Identity Se	rvices Engine	Home	➡ Operations	Policy	▶ Guest Access	Administration	▶ Work Centers		
RADIUS Livelog	TACACS Livelog	Reports	▶ Troubleshoot	Adaptive	e Network Control				
	Misconfigured Suppli	cants 🛈			Misconfigured Netw 0	work Devices (i)	RADIUS E 8	Props (1)	Client Stopped O
Show Live Sessi	ons 🙀 Add or Remo	ove Columns	🔻 🛞 Refresh 🛭 ତ	Reset Repe	at Counts				
Time	▼ Status All ▼ De	etails Repe	eat Count	y (i) E	Endpoint ID 🛞	Endpoint Profile 🕧	Authentication Policy 🕧	Authorization Policy 🛞	Authorization Profiles () N
2019-01-10 05:47	:56.460 🕕	à	5 08:CC:A	7:5F:06:0	8:CC:A7:5F:06:08	Unknown	Wired_C9200L >> Wired_MAB >> Default	Wired_C9200L >> Permit_all	PermitAccess
2019-01-10 05:46	:59.912 🍈	à	6 user2	2	8:52:61:68:D1:01	Unknown	Wired_C9200L >> Wired_dot1x >> Default	Wired_C9200L >> vlan212	vlan212_permit
2019-01-10 05:46	:57.288 🍈	à	4 user1	2	C:0B:E9:AD:AD:81	Unknown	Wired_C9200L >> Wired_dot1x >> Default	Wired_C9200L >> vlan211	vlan211_permit
2019-01-10 05:44	:36.602 🕕	à	0 28:52:6	51:68:D1:4 2	8:52:61:68:D1:41	Unknown	Wired_C9200L >> Wired_MAB >> Default	Wired_C9200L >> Permit_all	PermitAccess

Check the authentication log 1

Overview

Event	5200 Authentication succeeded
Username	user2⊕
Endpoint Id	28:52:61:68:D1:01 ⊕
Endpoint Profile	Unknown
Authentication Policy	Wired_C9200L >> Wired_dot1x >> Default
Authorization Policy	Wired_C9200L >> vlan212
Authorization Result	vlan212_permit
esult	
e <mark>sult</mark> State	ReauthSession:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0
	ReauthSession:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0 CACS:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0:ise20a/336458508/30
State	
State Class	CACS:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0:ise20a/336458508/30
State Class Funnel-Type	CACS:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0:ise20a/336458508/30 (tag=1) VLAN
State Class Funnel-Type Funnel-Medium-Type	CACS:A51E0A0A0000004735E2C9F0:ise20a/336458508/30 (tag=1) VLAN (tag=1) 802


Authentication Details	
Source Timestamp	2019-01-10 04:01:41.787
Received Timestamp	2019-01-10 04:01:41.788
Policy Server	ise20a
Event	5200 Authentication succeeded
Username	user2
User Type	User
Endpoint Id	28:52:61:68:D1:01
Calling Station Id	28-52-61-68-D1-01
Endpoint Profile	Unknown
Authentication Identity Store	Internal Users
Identity Group	User Identity Groups:vlan212,Unknown
Authentication Method	dot1x
Authentication Protocol	EAP-MD5
Service Type	Framed
Network Device	
NECHOIN DEVICE	C9200L
Device Type	C9200L All Device Types
Device Type	All Device Types
Device Type Location	All Device Types All Locations
Device Type Location NAS IPv4 Address	All Device Types All Locations 10.10.30.165
Device Type Location NAS IPv4 Address NAS Port Id	All Device Types All Locations 10.10.30.165 GigabitEthernet1/0/11

Segmentation

cisco lite!


Cisco TrustSec Traditional access control is extremely complex





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
TECARC-2900



Cisco TrustSec Simplified access control with Group Based Policy

Security-Trustworthy Solutions

cisco live!



Trustworthy system

During the equipment manufacturing process and equipment startup / operation A general term for mechanisms that ensure the integrity of hardware and software.

What is the guarantee of integrity? Is the hardware genuine, provided by the manufacturer, and is the software tampered with? Check / validate the device during "startup" and "running".



Risk reduction


Visualization of device integrity



Early detection of threats

Trustworthy System Overview

Trustworthy system = Mechanism for ensuring the integrity of HW / SW during equipment procurement, startup and operation



Cisco Catalyst 9000 Platform Trustworthy Solutions




Cisco® trustworthy systems use industry best practices to help ensure full development lifecycle integrity and end-to-end security

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TECARC-2900

Cisco Trust Anchor Module (TAm)




Secure Unique Device Identification (SUDI)

- Tamperproof ID for the device
- Binds the hardware identity to a key pair in a cryptographically secure X.509 certificate PID during manufacturing
- Connections with the device can be authenticated by the SUDI credential
- IEEE 802.1AR Compliant





Boot Sequence




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TECARC-2900

Cisco Secure Boot

Anchors Secure Boot in Hardware to Create a Chain of Trust

Cisco Secure Boot



 Only authentic signed Cisco software boots up on a Cisco platform


- The boot process stops if any step fails to authenticate
- IOS "show software authenticity" command illustrates the results

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
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Secure Boot Verification during boot up


Microloader doesn't display verification, if verification fails then the box doesn't boot at all.



Secure Boot Verification after bootup




After Secure Boot, IOS Software Verifies that Hardware is Authentic



TECARC-2900

HW Authenticity Check


- Trust Anchor Module (TAm) securely stores HW Identity (SUDI)
- After the operating system is up and running...
- IOS-XE automatically verifies that the HW is genuine





Trustworthy Features on Cat 9000 Family

Features	Catalyst 9000 Family (Open IOS-XE)
Image Signing	Yes
Secure Boot	Yes
Anti-Counterfeit Check	Yes
Trust Anchor Module	Yes
PnP SUDI Support	Yes
Run Time Defenses	Yes
X.509v3 SSH Authentication	Yes



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TECARC-2900

Secure, Resilient Campus with Catalyst 9000

← → C ▲ Not Seture Mass/110.126.71.241

Secure Infrastructure

Security

Secure Transport



Collection Trend Solution Solution Notice Address Solution Marrier Solution Marrier Solution Colspan="2">Colspan="2" Marrier Solution Marrier Solution Colspan="2" Marrier Solution Colspan="2" Solution Solution Solution Solution Colspan="2" Solution Solution Colspan="2" Solution <th cols


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sjstiverstrievvm79sjo4p65s2vEkirx bqt#doxxqxgTryJOgSLYHv5wgThA7N3KSzsfx5zt5D m\$4	
nqP5#18iyJt2FJ#oqyNpNUsz_izM0B5n#cfiDz2vSMMmf5j5Mm\$A##s9IeubycDv37TN4cKsIY\$	
* 840 1 VB-03 UKX\$VDDR 0695Y2 C-H18d00Evh 75kg5hx-1 x\$x /ex40-97 rJqvx268.\$\$7h	
31 0LW55#0'SIR:03#1MuEh#2C98g0P16TA 6R-\$v\$gCtidRO#On=EZGenarb0TZG6gbo #SUEvy	
#LkD8Iv fMKh9fU3akbi4QQ bW2#1#L #IL9Uy#q xVd0Be7h3N9#3gGqH6fbs: #a=\$j0j924z33	
# 799fkakdAC:ASEfmlP=850xKn2bqdku#81iT8u zoyp0m393# mpe\$QoBfk01u5#v1.WE74CIEE	5025
7.5jrlwaSD7ykCCl4fz>vVq40PPYmo6df=A9MR0jmvDWm5\$6orz5\$##yt4q10VgMSADvrt8gf8dDvJ	
MSIION206 QdMF3owwLt#i\$VRXP#GLz70 CJK\$OrAm5vAx0zm/kvH8k9g7a0a0D1fHd#4#\$Yn#Sus	
S6KTiG#rs1\$rovGIVoNGI5pswD0\$xadtp5d68XNA\$6214ZtvoI#0g1A6c8\$P\$0G0187W#f#FY1n0o]	
MsHMpxmuoD AEyvc24C#SqVm5vpSjvASRpRc#rEcOgfcUFtpRcMYco78ak3zBfR141Qaq0iZmogLoU	
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vk jS=o\$#E7tyGKwGO5##LwsQfKE\$s\$K24#5f0bZ=1W\$wqrcgFZx#Eqi2DYo5jfP\$mMJ#fiLscU0ap	ThES
n8riXVT80EQodmVFfd8se#qyB=b9nbr=iw#XI9v#128P#BAv\$XX6gx2HTT3Ex9kgCc0v#S9YGp=Tx2	
281mbr27v#2JtmHTn6Jcq0KqDsf#q1HxhkSzWv#k#RkppWAFWk13s5ouih0bUyt7t5R6Ld95u89M5b	
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v#mcrZs#Ef7i#ABaP04G_edb#1#rlSf0e\$Ajp7rXrjP#f0wpquyl#qGW3wey\$ritHdpc\$982QvMJtp	P8qz
gG#u#wJlaotzgz3Zbb#8zq73BNqj1lyuNTd9#3RF7qAU1GB#gz2Omj#DF9zfch8dom6Bx8O0pdUbp5	P5nb
M#=d9mTuKK1=sY1t=G5Piu\$##Ig\$c#Vd9lgzrfAO34Dk;#Xy1oODj;I9L14=5c#=Xo\$9t51KgMx5x	
dF1v16\$BV\$#L#\$beX##IgqV06RIH1ESb#ad8pMpah7DRhmr9n1rqLy\$uQXgTpuuwMb\$DB5hxdXj2Sc	
clqbLkBx2a8y\$z\$ceDdPN5Lx8x7#xMRYJk#Rfdbn4#\$k##2ogR#Bt7NV4D61Un4z\$GenX00dFjde#t	
8:#jktQmR0\$vUcDJJIG8uU1YTv1Ur4hdQRr#\$a3r8gDIq9IiDG9m863vyt4ncb5#\$ad18q0o2HrA8G2	
r9\$zqyFjz0HjdSrimsX4z2p7c4YqYuH98e4r06tFm5fnujmwbM%cL28#pJj0P4KKd#bHjkTTY7\$B#b	
w8XzwNLoFMyoV##\$9ht##H#kcr3aGkcSANEuiFj6#R4OrxnV;j692HFmX737v2qx#aQcVi12vhNH2t	
RCh041jQeowf\$mT\$8pdnj5Uyjle3#RVstlxRInB\$0o2BZRTDs3lVlYj#aeVe.34Veqob9ee\$\$fVeBn	
D#IjVOrmKwJl=bhqB299R71P93QT\$8c1=G=LJ9k4Z#Z6P#2g2A2QkTimloVkr0Wwcp_b_3Kpp3NHQ#	
SILYsr72gRLwdc\$m0"6mF0nHNjlq\$&wTxRyv0:5R3bI_F\$nw04Sfs6qhA#SRfoT1Lv8sTxgd_@06m3	
wKD=3k0olCkCEop1Wwijgz:ScdSC\$6hkybôicSh\$hH#emHZ.k=xLISITE37vr\$2wy2yrA954L7iHni	
<pre>%4WnB1RASSekusB81a#LTee#w\$#071mqmp8cmrP\$w63ar52ItaX9x9S1hF7rS1Kr#5j%C08#Mdxjjc# %4rmu</pre>	2214

Trustworthy Systems Hardware Authenticity		Encrypted Traffic Analytics Traffic Analytics		MACSEC 256 Man-in- the-Middle	

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TECARC-2900

Telemetry




3.6 AVC

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AVC 62

Challenges of Today's Network



Yesterday's Applications

 \geq




Today's Applications



Know, Monitor & Control Your Applications

Granular Detection, Advanced Monitoring & Business Logic Based Policies



AVC Features

Application Recognition

- Generation Deep Packet Inspection Technology
- NBAR2: Network Based Application Recognition 2
- Dynamic / Protocol Packup Grade
- Custom application

Visibility


- Protocol Discovery per interface, per direction
- FNF with application name as match/collect

Control

Application based QOS

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Network Based Application Recognition 2 (NBAR2)



- Optimize the Application experience in the network
- Hitless Protocol Pack update allows adding more applications.
- Supported devices :
 - from 16.6(3): Catalyst 9300
 - from 16.9.1: Catalyst 9400
 - from 16.11.1: Catalyst 9200
- Requires a Cisco DNA Advantage license

Recognizes ~1500 Apps ~140 Encrypted Apps

NBAR2 on Catalyst 9000 – How is it done?

Performance and scale

2000 cps with max 10000 flows (24 port switch) 2000 cps with max 20000 flows (48 port switch) CPU varies from 10% - 40%





- Original packets of a flow are hardware-switched to destination
- Copies of the initial few packets of a flow to CPU
- The software interacts with the NBAR2 module and detect the Application.



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How will it work in Campus?

NBAR2 Protocol Library

			Print
Updated: June 23, 20	18		
Downloading NB	AR2 Protocol Packs		
NBAR2 Protocol Packs	s are available for download on the Cisco.com soft	ware download page	, here:
http://www.cisco.com	l/cisco/software/navigator.html		
On the download page	e, specify a platform model to display software ava	ilable for download.	One software option is NBAR2 Protocol Packs.
Example:			
To display protocol pa	cks available for the Cisco ASR 1001 platform, ope	en the link provided a	bove and navigate as follows:
Products > Routers >	Service Provider Edge Routers > ASR 1000 Serie	es Aggregation Serv	rices Routers > ASR 1001 Router
DOWNLOAD HERE			
NBAR2 Protocol	Packs for Cisco IOS and IOS-XE Relea	ISES	
Protocol Pack	Supported Releases	Supported From	
Protocol Pack 38.0.0	Releases supported by Protocol Pack upgrade: IOS-XE Everest 16.6.2	2018-06-22	
Release Notes			
Protocol Pack 37.0.0	Releases supported by Protocol Pack upgrade:	2019 05 01	

2018-05-01

0040

SKYPE

Name/CLI Keyword	skype
Full Name	Skype
Description	Skype software uses a proprietary Internet telephony (VoIP) network called the Skype protocol. Part of the Skype technology relies on the Global Index peer-to-peer protocol belonging to the Joltid Ltd. corporation. Skype is software that contains several features such as telephone calls over the Internet, instant messaging, file transfer and video conferencing.
Reference	http://www.skype.com
Global ID	L7:83
ID	83
Known Mappings	
UDP Port	53,5353
TCP Port	53,80,443,5353, 33033
IP Protocol	-
IP Version	
IPv4 Support	Yes
IPv6 Support	Yes
Application Group	skype-group
Business Relevance	business-irrelevant. From Cisco IOS XE 3.16S and IOS 15.5(3)M only.
Category	voice-and-video
Sub Category	voice-video-chat-collaboration
P2P Technology	Yes
Encrypted	Yes
Traffic-class	multimedia-conferencing. From Cisco IOS XE 3.16S and IOS 15.5(3)M only.
Tunnel	No
Underlying Protocols	dns,http,ssl

Updatable packs are available from 16.6(4) for

IOS-XE Everest 16.6.2

Release Notes


Protocol Pack 36.0.0 Built into:

http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/qos_nbar/prot_lib/config_library/nbar-prot-pack-library.html



NBAR2 Data Path – First Packet in Flow


- 1. NBAR is enabled on interface. Flow table activates the monitor. First packet of a flow is seen.
- 2. A new Neflow entry is created with 'Copy to CPU' attribute.
- 3. Original packet continues normal processing.
- 4. Duplicated packet is punted to CPU with some packet metadata like interface ID.
- 5. Packet forwarded to NBAR Library.
- 6. NBAR creates a flow in the flow table. Default idle timeout is configured for the FT flow.
- 7. In parallel, new netflow entry is reported to the software cache.
- 8. Counters, timestamps and TCP flags are offloaded periodically to the software cache.






NBAR2 Data Path – App Resolution Packet

- 1. Packet of application resolution arrives.
- 2. NBAR updates protocol in the Flow Table.
- 3. NBAR updates Flow Table idle timeout for this flow, based on the identified application.
- 4. NBAR scratch pad (Feature Object) is freed and cloned packet is discarded.
- 5. Flow table 'sync' the flow with Netflow cache: Update indexes of netflow entries for both direction.
- 6. Mark Netflow entries to stop cloning packets.
- 7. Update App ID in FNF HW cache for QOS usage.







NBAR2 Socket Cache Classification - Example



NBAR2 Socket Cache Classification - Example



NBAR2 Socket Cache Classification - Example



Classification and Encryption





NBAR2 Encrypted traffic – techniques

Outside the organization (usually non collaborative):


- SSL handshake analysis certificate, Server Name Indication (SNI)
- DNS traffic analysis
- Machine learning/Statistical classification

Inside the organization (usually collaborative):


- Customization of SSL certificates and DNS domains
- Server and client discovery based on NBAR2
- SD-AVC External Sources

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
NBAR2 DNS Classification - Example



NBAR2 DNS Classification - Example



NBAR2 DNS Classification - Example



NBAR2 Encryption Classification



Automatic (Signature)

Secure Sockets Layer E TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 167 🖃 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 163 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ■ Random Session ID Length: 0 Cipher Suites Length: 72 Compression Methods Length: 1 E Compression Methods (1 method) Extensions Length: 50 Extension: server_name Type: server_name (0x0000) Length: 20 Server Name Indication extension Server Name list length: 18 Server Name Type: host_name (0) Server Name length: 15 Server Name: www.youtube.com

Custom

🗆 Secure Sockets Layer
🗉 TLSV1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 188
🗆 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
Length: 184
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
Session ID Length: 0
Cipher Suites Length: 74
⊞ Cipher Suites (37 suites)
Compression Methods Length: 1
🗄 Compression Methods (1 method)
Extensions Length: 69
🗆 Extension: server_name
Type: server_name (0x0000)
Length: 27
🗆 Server Name Indication extension
Server Name list length: 25
Server Name Type: host_name (0)
Server Name length: 22
Server Name: schoolnet.ccsocdev.net

"(.*[.])?((youtube(-nocookie)?|ytimg|googlevideo)[.]com)|youtu[.]be" cisco(config)#ip nbar custom CCSOC composite server-name "*ccsocdev.net"

🗆 Extension, elliptic surves



NBAR2 Encrypted Traffic Classification Summary

- Most of the traffic is encrypted traffic and is SSL/TLS
- Testing shows more than 80% of SSL traffic is classified by NBAR2
- All major internet/cloud applications are supported
- NBAR2 classifies both cloud and local encrypted traffic
- NBAR2 use a variety of techniques to classify encrypted traffic



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